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Alternatives, Adoption, and Administrative
Hearings: Keys to Performing
Environmental Reviews for
Yucca Mountain
TYSON R. SMITH*

For the past fifty years, spent nuclear fuel has been accumulating at power reactor sites across the country, but very little progress has been made in finding a way to dispose of it. However,
with the 2004 presidential election well behind us-and the
avowed anti-Yucca Mountain candidate defeated nationally (and
in Nevada)-there might finally be some movement in Department of Energy's (DOE's) efforts to construct and operate a permanent geologic repository. Indeed, DOE stated that it would
submit its application for a license to construct and operate a repository in late-2005 or early-2006.
This article examines several aspects of that license application related to the obligations of both DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). More specifically, it addresses the timing and
venue for challenges to DOE's Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) used to support its application for construction authorization of a geologic repository. This article focuses on judicial
and administrative reviews in the context of FEIS adoption by
NRC. Finally, this article discusses the NRC staffs review of
DOE's FEIS and the extent to which substantive challenges to
DOE's FEIS may be pursued in the course of NRC administrative
hearings.
* Attorney, Winston & Strawn LLP, J.D. 2003, Lewis and Clark Law School,
Certificate in Environmental and Natural Resource Law; M.S. 1999, Stanford University, Civil and Environmental Engineering; B.S. 1995, Vanderbilt University, Civil
and Environmental Engineering. Mr. Smith was formerly an attorney in the Office of
the General Counsel at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. All views expressed in
this article are those of Mr. Smith and do not reflect those of the Commission. The
Commission has not yet taken a position on the principal issues addressed in this
article and has indicated neither approval nor disapproval of the positions that Mr.
Smith takes in this article.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1983, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(NWPA), which acknowledged federal responsibility to provide for
permanent disposal of the nation's spent nuclear fuel and highlevel radioactive waste.1 The NWPA did not select a site; rather,
it initiated the process by selecting sites for study as potential geologic repositories. 2 Accordingly, DOE identified nine candidate
sites, and the Secretary of Energy nominated five of the nine for
further characterization: Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Deaf Smith
County, Texas; the Hanford Reservation, Washington; Richton
Dome, Mississippi; and Davis Canyon, Utah. 3 After issuing environmental assessments for those five sites, DOE recommended
and the President approved three of the five as candidates for a
permanent repository: Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Deaf Smith
County, Texas; and the Hanford Reservation, Washington. 4 In
1987, Congress made substantial changes to the NWPA, including
identifying one of the three candidate sites, Yucca Mountain, as
the only site to be further characterized as a potential repository
5
location.
In February 2002, the Secretary of Energy formally recommended the Yucca Mountain site to the President for approval,
along with the DOE's FEIS. 6 The following day, the President recommended the Yucca Mountain site to Congress pursuant to section 114(a) of the N PA. 7 The State of Nevada submitted a notice
of disapproval to Congress within sixty days of the President's recommendation.8 On July 9, 2002, the U.S. Senate cast the final
legislative vote, overriding the notice of disapproval; and on July
23, 2002, the President signed a joint resolution designating
1. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2000).
2. Id. § 10132(b).

3. DOE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY
FOR THE DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AT
YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NYE COUNTY, NEVADA 1-9 (2002) [hereinafter DOE FEIS].
4. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 10133.
6. Letter from Spencer Abraham, Sec'y of Energy, DOE, to George W. Bush, U.S.
President, (Feb. 14, 2002), httpJ/www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymp/sr/salp.pdf.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a); Letter to Congressional Leaders Recommending the
Yucca Mountain Site for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Nuclear Waste, 1
PUB. PAPERS 234 (Feb. 15, 2002).

8. 42 U.S.C. § 10135(a); Kenny C. Guinn, Governor of Nevada, Statement of
Reasons Supporting the Governor of Nevada's Notice of Disapproval of the Proposed
Yucca Mountain Project (Apr. 8, 2002), http://www.yuccamountain.orgtpdf/govveto0402.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss2/6

2

2006]

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS FOR YUCCA MTN.

467

Yucca Mountain as the site for a geologic repository.9 The next
step is for the Secretary of Energy to submit an application for
construction authorization to the NRC, accompanied by DOE's
FEIS.10 The following sections describe how the NWPA has limited the alternatives to be considered in the DOE FEIS and discusses how the NRC will implement its NEPA 11 responsibilities
under the NWPA.
II. NEPA AND NUCLEAR WASTE: FEIS
ALTERNATIVES
A.

Defining DOE's Duties

While NEPA would typically require consideration of both alternative methods of disposal of spent nuclear fuel and alternative
locations for disposal of spent nuclear fuel, 12 the NVPA restricts
the scope of alternatives in a repository environmental impact
statement. 13 Specifically, with regard to NEPA, "compliance with
the procedures and requirements of [the NWPA] shall be deemed
adequate consideration of the need for a repository, the time of the
initial availability of a repository, and all alternatives to the isolation of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in a repository." 14 As to DOE-specific NEPA obligations, the Secretary
of Energy "need not consider alternative sites to the Yucca Mountain site for the repository to be developed .... "15 Further, the
Commission will adopt DOE's FEIS "to the extent practicable,"
and "such adoption shall . . . satisfy the responsibilities of the
Commission under [NEPA]. "16 The NWPA goes on to limit the responsibilities of DOE and the Commission under NEPA by precluding consideration of "the need for a repository, the time of
initial availability of a repository, alternate sites to the Yucca
17
Mountain site, or nongeologic alternatives to such site."
9. H.R.J. Res. 87, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(b).
11. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2000).
12. Id. § 4332.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(f).
14. Id. § 10134(f)(2).
15. Id. § 10134(f)(3).
16. Id. § 10134(f)(4).
17. Id. § 10134(f)(6). At first blush, this language appears to suggest that the
NRC is required to issue its own FEIS. However, the language in question appears to
have been designed as an editorial measure, lacking substantive effect. See NEPA
Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 54 Fed. Reg.
27,864, 27,867 (July 3, 1989). The legislative history demonstrates that no important
change was being made in NRC's NEPA responsibilities, which under the 1982 stat-
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Why the Limitations?

The restrictions on NEPA analyses and consideration of alternatives fall into two categories: alternative methods of disposal
and alternative sites for disposal. The limitations on consideration of alternative disposal technologies were first imposed in the
1982 Act,' 8 while the 1987 Amendments further limited consideration of alternative sites to a single site: Yucca Mountain. 19
Taken together, the scope of a NEPA alternatives analysis in a
repository FEIS is considerably limited, but portions are nevertheless left intact.
First, the NWPA of 1982 limited consideration of disposal alternatives of spent nuclear fuel to a geologic repository and thus
ended speculation as to the fate of spent nuclear fuel from the nation's reactor fleet. 20 Previously, the nation had flirted with fuel
reprocessing and had also examined various technologies for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, including mined geologic disposal, very deep hole disposal, disposal in a mined cavity
that resulted from rock melting, island-based geologic disposal,
sub-seabed disposal, ice sheet disposal, well injection disposal,
transmutation, and space disposal. 2 ' But, in the NWPA of 1982,
Congress announced geologic disposal as the nation's method of
choice for spent fuel disposal and began a process for selecting
sites for technical study as potential geologic repository locations. 2 2 To streamline the NEPA process and to take into account
this legislative selection of a preferred disposal method, the 1982
Act limited NEPA by excluding consideration of alternative meth23
ods of disposal other than a geologic repository.
ute were limited in the manner described in 10 C.F.R. § 51.109 (2004) (implementing
the NWPA's requirement that the NRC adopt DOE's FEIS to the extent practicable
by limiting NRC review of DOE's FEIS to the impacts of actions not considered in the
FEIS, significant and substantial new information, or new considerations). Id. However, the language is not surplusage, for NRC may have an obligation to prepare a
supplemental FEIS where there are new considerations or new information (or to the
extent DOE's FEIS is not adopted). Id.
18. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2000).
19. Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203,
§ 5011(e)-(g), 101 Stat. 1330-227 to -256) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10133).
20. Program of Research and Development for Management and Disposal of Commercially Generated Radioactive Wastes, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,677 (May 14, 1981).
21. Id.; DOE FEIS, supra note 3, at 1-8.
22. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270.
23. Id. § 10134(f)(2), (6) (excluding consideration of "all alternatives to the isolation of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in a repository" and
"nongeologic alternatives to such site").
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Next, the 1987 Amendments to the NWPA further restricted
the scope of NEPA alternatives for the geologic repository program by limiting consideration of alternative sites for a repository
to a single site, Yucca Mountain. 24 The amended NWPA effectively ended the process of site characterization that had begun
with five potential repository sites in three different geologic media and directed the Secretary of Energy to study the Yucca Mountain site and recommend whether the President should approve
the site for development as a repository to the exclusion of other
sites. 25 To address the NEPA implications stemming from the
choice of Yucca Mountain as the sole candidate for a geologic repository, Congress made two amendments to the provisions limiting the scope of NEPA review. Those amendments specify that an
FEIS for the repository "need not consider alternate sites to the
Yucca Mountain site. .... ,,26 Thus, Congress effectively precluded
DOE's FEIS from considering development of an alternative repository at any of the four other sites.
The NRC regulations implementing the NEPA limitations of
the 1987 Amendments also demonstrate the Commission's contemporaneous view of the NWPA and NEPA. To give effect to the
limitations on the NEPA process imposed by the NWPA, those
regulations prescribe the environmental information that DOE is
required to submit to the NRC as an applicant for a license
amendment or construction authorization.2 7 "In lieu of an environmental report, [DOE] . . . shall submit ... any final environmental impact statement which the Department prepares in
connection with any geologic repository .... ,,28 In addition, the
FEIS "shall include, among the alternatives under consideration,
denial of a license or construction authorization by the Commission." 29 This requirement is consistent with the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ's) NEPA regulations requiring agencies
to consider the "alternative of no action" as part of any environmental impact statement. 30 Moreover, the NRC's "no-action alter24. Id. § 10172.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10132-10134.
26. Id. § 10134(f)(3); see also id. § 10134(f)(6).
27. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 54
Fed. Reg. 27,867 (July 3, 1989). It is worth noting that, at this point, DOE did not
object to the proposed NRC regulations that required the repository FEIS to consider
denial of a construction authorization or license as an alternative. See id. at 27,86727,868.
28. 10 C.F.R. § 51.67(a) (2005).
29. Id.
30. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2005).
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native" requirement is consistent with the NWPA because the
Commission requires a discussion of denial of the application to
license Yucca Mountain but not a discussion of alternative disposal methods or sites.
Thus, the FEIS that DOE submits to support its license application is considerably limited relative to the general obligations
that NEPA imposes on most federal agency actions. The next section will examine how the NWPA affects the NRC environmental
review process and satisfies NRC's NEPA obligations.
III.
A.

NEPA AND THE NRC: FEIS ADOPTION

The Commission's Regulations

The NWPA imposes some specific requirements for the NRC
environmental review process aside from the limitations on
NEPA. Section 114(f)(4) requires the NRC to "[adopt] to the extent practicable" DOE's repository FEIS. 3 1 Further, "[t]o the extent such statement is adopted by the Commission, such adoption
shall be deemed to also satisfy the responsibilities of the Commission under [NEPA] and no further consideration shall be required
"32

In 1989, the Commission promulgated regulations to implement the NWPA's NEPA provisions with respect to a licensing
proceeding for the proposed repository, in part to guide the determination of whether adoption of DOE's FEIS is "practicable"
within the meaning of section 114(f)(4) of the NWPA. 3 3 Upon receipt of DOE's license application for the proposed geologic repository, "the appropriate NRC staff director will include in the notice
of docketing required to be published by § 2.101(f)(8) of this chapter a statement of Commission intention to adopt the [FEIS] to the
extent practicable." 34 Further, the final rules dictated that "upon
the publication of the notice of hearing in the Federal Register" for
the proceeding, "the NRC staff shall . . .present its position on
whether it is practicable to adopt, without further supplementation, the [FEIS] (including any supplement thereto) prepared by
the Secretary of Energy."3 5 However, the most important part of
31. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(f)(4).

32. Id.
33. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 54
Fed. Reg. 27,864 (July 3, 1989).
34. 10 C.F.R. § 51.26(c).
35. Id. § 51.109(a)(1).
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the final rule was the Commission standard governing the determination of "practicability." It states that:
The presiding officer will find that it is practicable to adopt any
environmental impact statement prepared by the Secretary of
Energy in connection with a geologic repository proposed to be
constructed under Title I of the [NWPA], unless:
(1) (i) The action proposed to be taken by the Commission
differs from the action proposed in the license application submitted by the Secretary of Energy; and (ii) The
difference may significantly affect the quality of the
human environment; or
(2) Significant and substantial new information or new
considerations render such environmental impact
36
statement inadequate.
This standard will guide the staff in formulating its position on
whether it is practicable to adopt the FEIS.3 7 Ultimately, the presiding officer in the proceeding will find that it is practicable to
adopt DOE's FEIS unless it is deficient under the criteria specified in paragraphs (c)(1) or (2).38
Although the Commission's regulations may seem fairly
straightforward, they are complicated by some of the underlying
assumptions in the rule. The following paragraphs discuss the
tension among these issues: the Commission's NEPA responsibilities, the appropriate venue for review of the adequacy of the FEIS,
36. Id. § 51.109(c).
37. Id. § 51.109(a)(1).
38. This reflects the view taken by the Commission in the course of its 1989
rulemaking that an independent analysis of DOE's FEIS is not necessary for NRC
adoption of DOE's FEIS so long as the NRC's standard for adoption is met. See NEPA
Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 53 Fed.
Reg. 16,131, 16,138 (May 5, 1988). This view is contrary to the CEQ's regulations on
FEIS adoption, which provide that an agency adopting another agency's FEIS must
independently review the FEIS to ascertain that it satisfies NEPA. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1506.3(b) (2005); Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,263,
34,265 (July 28, 1983). Executive Order 11,991, which is the source of CEQ's authority to promulgate regulations, states that federal agencies must comply with CEQ
regulations, "except where such compliance would be inconsistent with statutory requirements." Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977). This language may be interpreted as exempting an agency from full compliance whenever an
implicit or an explicit conflict with its statutory mission exists. Here, the Commission
departed from the CEQ's position because it believed that Congress had intentionally
restricted the NRC's normal NEPA duties in the NWPA, in which the adequacy of the
repository FEIS is to be determined by Congress and the courts outside of the NRC's
licensing process. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Respositories for High-Level
Waste, 53 Fed. Reg. at 16,138.
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and the views of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C. Circuit) on judicial review of the DOE's
FEIS, as expressed in the case of Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v.
EPA. This article also charts a possible solution that would reconcile the NWPA, NRC regulations on adoption, and NuclearEnergy
Institute, Inc. 39 The suggested solution would achieve the Commission's goals of early judicial review of the adequacy of the
FEIS, focus NRC administrative proceedings on radiological
safety, and ensure fairness by granting an opportunity for potential parties to seek review, in some forum, of the FEIS.
B.

Conflicting Views on Adoption

Implementation of the adoption process is complicated by the
lack of prior judicial review of the adequacy of the DOE's FEIS.
More specifically, one presumption in the NRC's rulemaking on
practicability is that the FEIS would be subject to prior judicial
and congressional scrutiny before being used to support a license
application for construction authorization. 40 The Commission has
taken a consistent view of its responsibilities since at least 1988.
In its discussion of the proposed rules on practicability, the Commission opined that:
In the light of the policies and procedures established by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the Commission regards the scope of its
NEPA review to be narrowly constrained, with those issues that
were ripe for consideration after issuance of DOE's [F]EIS being
excluded from independent examination, for4purposes
of NEPA,
1
in the course of NRC licensing proceedings.
The Commission explicitly declared that an entirely independent
review of the adequacy of DOE's FEIS prior to adoption was not
necessary because "there had been an opportunity for judicial review." 4 2 Further, the Commission reasoned that total deference to
the balancing judgments in DOE's FEIS would not "be an abdication of the Commission's NEPA authority" because there was a
special scheme in the NWPA for consideration of environmental
impacts by interested parties and Congress, and there would be a
39. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
40. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 54
Fed. Reg. 27,864.
41. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 53
Fed. Reg. at 16,136.
42. Id. at 16,138.
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prior judicial determination that the FEIS was adequate. 4 3 In
short, based on opportunities for judicial and congressional review
in the NWPA, the Commission decided that it could safely presume the adequacy of DOE's FEIS. Based on that presumption,
the Commissions concluded that it needed to focus only on
"[slignificant and substantial new information or new considerations [that might] render such environmental impact statement
44
inadequate."
In the statements of consideration accompanying the final
rule, the Commission elaborated on the special statutory provisions governing the NRC's NEPA responsibilities. First, "the
Commission [emphasized] that its role under NWPA is oriented
toward health and safety issues and that, in general, nonradiological environmental issues are intended to be resolved in advance of NRC licensing decisions through the actions of the
[DOE], subject to congressional and judicial review . . . ,,45 The
Commission also addressed comments that cautioned the NRC not
to rely on a prior court ruling that had upheld the adequacy of
DOE's FEIS. 4 6 The Commission responded:
In fact, such reliance is not essential. It is our expectation that,
under NWPA, a petition for review of the [F]EIS would need to
have been filed roughly contemporaneously with DOE's submission of a license application to NRC, and that judgment might
have been entered within the three years envisaged for Commission licensing. Whether or not this proves to be the case is not
controlling, for the standard for adoption does not rest upon col43. Id.
44. 10 C.F.R. § 51.109(c)(2) (2005). This standard is substantially the same as the
applicable CEQ regulations that specify when agencies must prepare a supplemental
FEIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1) (2005). Courts have interpreted these regulations
as requiring supplementation where "new information" shows "that the remaining
action will 'affec[t] the quality of the human environment' in a significant manner or
to a significant extent not already considered." Marsh v. Or. Nat. Resources Council,
490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989) (citations omitted). "ET]he new circumstance must present a
seriously different picture of the environmental impact of the proposed project from
what was previously envisioned." Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 816 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir.
1987).
45. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 54
Fed. Reg. at 27,865.
46. At least in part, the comment recognized that any challenge to the FEIS in
federal court would not be complete at the time of the license application submission
because the NWPA required DOE to submit the application within ninety days of the
site designation taking effect. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(b) (2000). Although DOE did not
meet this deadline, the Commission's response nevertheless addresses the implications of federal court proceedings.
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lateral estoppel principles. Similarly, we find it beside the point
to speculate regarding the possibility that a reviewing court
might delay its decision on the adequacy until it sees the NRC
conclusions in the licensing proceeding. Such delay would not
47
stand in the way of the Commission's taking final action.
In that statement, the Commission acknowledges that judicial review of the FEIS could occur prior to the license application or
could take place while the application was under NRC review, and
explains that, in any event, the Commission would not consider
the adequacy of the FEIS in its administrative process. The presumption of judicial review would apply no matter the posture because there would be an opportunity for judicial review. Thus, the
Commission chose a clear path forward: presume the adequacy of
the FEIS at the time of submission and limit the scope of NRC's
NEPA adoption review to new and significant information while,
at the same time, recognizing that parallel proceedings in federal
court may be reviewing the adequacy of DOE's FEIS.
However, in Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc., v. EPA, the D.C.
Circuit appeared to expand the issues to be considered in NRC
administrative hearings beyond those contemplated in the NRC's
regulations. The court held that Nevada would not feel the effect
of the FEIS in a concrete way until it was used to support some
other DOE or NRC final decision, and thus Nevada's substantive
claims against the FEIS would not be ripe until the FEIS is used
to support a concrete and final decision of DOE or NRC. 48 More
ominously, however, the court went on to speculate about the extent to which substantive claims on the FEIS could be addressed
in NRC administrative hearings. The court opined that substantive claims against the FEIS "would certainly raise 'new considerations' with regard to any decision to adopt the FEIS," and
therefore "Nevada will not be foreclosed from raising substantive
claims against the FEIS in administrative proceedings . . .49
47. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 54
Fed. Reg. at 27,866.
48. See Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
("We agree with DOE that any challenge to the FEIS, insofar as it may be adopted in
support of a future NRC construction-authorization or licensing decision or used by
DOE in support of a future transportation-alternative selection, is not yet ripe for
review.").
49. Id. at 1314. The court's conclusion was buttressed by "the assurances of counsel for both NRC and DOE at oral argument that Nevada will be permitted to raise its
substantive challenges to the FEIS in any NRC proceeding to decide whether to adopt
the FEIS and in any DOE proceeding to select a transportation alternative." Id. at

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss2/6

10

20061

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS FOR YUCCA MTN. 475

Thus, the court's decision created a tension between the Commission's view of the scope of its NEPA review responsibilities
under the NWPA (as embodied in NRC regulations on adoption)
and judicial and administrative review of final agency actions (as
described by the D.C. Circuit). The Commission took the view
that its focus should be on the "delta" between DOE's FEIS and
new and significant information not already considered, and that
substantive challenges to the adequacy of the "base" FEIS should
be taken up in the federal courts. Consequently, the Commission's regulations on adoption of the repository FEIS do not contain any regulatory standards or processes for assessing the
adequacy of DOE's "base" FEIS. 50 On the other hand, the court
seems to suggest that all FEIS-related issues (including the adequacy of both the "base" and "delta" FEIS) are open to substantive
review in NRC administrative hearings. Thus, the NRC staff is
faced with conflicting judicial and regulatory mandates, without a
guiding review standard.
C.

Resolving the Conflict
1.

Basics of the Resolution

At the outset, the NRC staffs position should, at a minimum,
ensure consistency between the statutory provisions of the NWPA,
the Commission's regulations, and the holding of the D.C. Circuit
in Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. In addition, the staff perspective
should reflect congressional efforts (via the NWPA) to avoid dupli1313 (citing Oral Argument Tr. at 149-52, 169-71). However, this issue was not
briefed by the parties, nor was it discussed in detail at oral argument.
50. The Commission does not generally review an FEIS for adequacy, because the
NRC would typically prepare and be responsible for producing a document that satisfies NEPA in the first instance. NRC has developed guidance on preparing an FEIS.
See, e.g., NRC, FINAL REPORT: ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW GUIDANCE FOR LICENSING AcTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH NMSS PROGRAMS, NUREG-1748 (2003). Because the goal of
NEPA is to identify impacts and inform an agency decision rather than produce a
particular result, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-4334 (2000), DOE's FEIS could be adequate to
fulfill the requirements of NEPA even if the NRC, looking at the same set of environmental impacts, would choose a different proposed action. AS a result, this guidance
would not be wholly applicable to a review of the adequacy of another agency's FEIS
because the weighing and balancing of socio-economic costs and benefits (or the determination of significance of environmental impacts and mitigation) have already been
made by DOE. However, the guidance could be helpful for some aspects of an adequacy review such as describing the form and content of the FEIS, identifying the
scope of review of environmental impacts, and determining whether the FEIS adequately addresses public comments. Nevertheless, neither the adoption regulations
nor the staff guidance provide a definitive regulatory standard for determining the
adequacy of another agency's FEIS.
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cation of NEPA reviews, the Commission's conclusion that its environmental reviews should focus on radiological safety, and the
public's right to meaningful review of agency decisions. Taking
these factors into account, the best solution is to consider submission of DOE's license application and accompanying FEIS a "final
agency action" triggering an opportunity for review of DOE's FEIS
in the courts of appeals and limiting NEPA considerations in NRC
proceedings to the criteria in 10 C.F.R. § 51.109(c). As a result,
review of the adequacy of the "base" FEIS and the "delta" FEIS
would proceed on parallel tracks in a court of appeals and NRC
administrative proceedings, respectively. This interpretation of
the statute and regulation avoids duplicate adjudication of the
"base" FEIS and the adoption process and delivers substantial
practical benefits.
2.

Judicial Review

Section 119 of the NWPA does not itself provide for judicial
review. 5 1 Instead, section 119 merely confers subject matter jurisdiction on the courts of appeals. 5 2 Thus, any cause of action challenging the adequacy of the FEIS must be brought under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA),53 which authorizes suits
challenging only final agency actions for which there is no remedy
in court. 54 Thus, the question arises whether submission of the
license application is a "final agency action" that would trigger an
opportunity for judicial review. An analysis of this issue, and the
related issues of ripeness and exhaustion, follows.
a. Final Agency Action
The APA authorizes judicial review of final agency actions for
which there is no other adequate remedy at law. 55 For an agency
action to be final, generally two conditions must be satisfied:
"First, the action must mark the 'consummation' of the agency's
decisionmaking process ....
And second, the action must be one
by which 'rights or obligations have been determined,' or from
which legal obligations flow." 5 6
51. 42 U.S.C. § 10139 (2000).
52. Id. at § 10139(a).
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (2000).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
55. Id.
56. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (citing Chicago & Southern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948), and Port of Boston
Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
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To determine whether an agency action is final, courts look to
whether the agency "has arrived at a definitive position on the
issue" in question 57 and whether its impact is "sufficiently direct
and immediate."5 8 Also, an agency action is not final if it is "only
the ruling of a subordinate official ... or tentative."5 9 The phrase
"final action" does not turn on the word "action," "which is meant
to cover comprehensively every manner in which an agency may
exercise its power."60 Rather, it turns on the word "'final,' which
requires that the action under review 'mark the consummation of
the agency's decisionmaking process."'61 For the reasons discussed below, the DOE license application constitutes a final
agency action for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
According to DOE, the license application is a "formal document an applicant submits to the NRC to present proposed activities" 62 that "must be signed by the Secretary of Energy or [an]
authorized representative." 63 The application consists of general
information and a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and must be accompanied by an FEIS. 64 The application reflects the DOE perspective on pre- and post-closure safety analyses, including
structures, systems, and components important to safety; design
features for preventing and minimizing safety hazards; and information on how natural and engineered barriers will work together
to contain and isolate waste. 65 The application also describes
programmatic activities such as quality assurance programs and
recordkeeping obligations. 66 In short, the license application is a
single, comprehensive, and concrete document that reflects DOE's
balancing among competing policy, environmental, and safety concerns. As such, the Secretary of Energy's signature on the license
application consummates DOE's decision to seek permission to
build and operate a repository of a certain type at the Yucca
Mountain site.
57. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144 (1993) (quoting Williamson County Reg'l
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985)).
58. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
59. Id. at 151.
60. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n., 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001).
61. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78).
62. DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., Contents of the License Application Fact Sheet (2005) [hereinafter License Application Fact Sheet], http://www.
ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/doeymp0 112.shtml.
63. 10 C.F.R. § 63.22 (2005).
64. License Application Fact Sheet, supra note 62.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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The license application also implicates a variety of rights and
obligations and directly initiates legal consequences. First, as discussed above, the application satisfies DOE's statutory responsibility to submit a license application. 6 7 Submitting the
application and accompanying FEIS obligates the Commission to
submit annual reports to Congress and triggers the start of the
NRC's three-year deadline (with a four-year period possible, provided that the NRC fulfills certain reporting requirements) to issue a licensing decision on the application. 6 Accordingly,
submitting the license application and FEIS creates legal duties
and compels nondiscretionary actions by the Secretary of Energy
and by the Commission. 6 9 Moreover, if the NRC determines that
the tendered application is complete and acceptable for docketing,
the Commission must present a position on adoption. 70 The docketing of the license application also commences a thirty-day period
for submitting contentions (and facts supporting standing), which,
if accepted by the licensing board, would confer party status on
the host state, affected units of local government, or other interested entities. 71 Thus, the Secretary of Energy's decision directly
determines DOE and NRC's legal obligations and leads to an immediate impact on potential intervenors.
The legal conclusion that the license application and FEIS
submission constitute a final agency action is valid despite the
facts that DOE's license application is subject to change through
the NRC administrative process and construction will not begin
until the NRC has made a licensing decision. First, the "final
agency action" conclusion must focus on the DOE application
rather than NRC's administrative process. An extensive body of
case law addresses similar situations involving multiple federal
agencies, and each case finds a final agency action even where the
proposed action was subject to modification. 72 For example, in
67. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(b) (2000).
68. Id. § 10134(c), (d).
69. See generally Corus Group PLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 352 F.3d 1351, 135859 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding "legal consequences" where the agency action triggered
nondiscretionary activities). Although it is unlikely that anyone would bring a legal
challenge to force the NRC to make a decision so long as the administrative process
was underway, there could clearly be an APA claim to compel "unreasonably delayed"
agency action if the administrative process appeared inexplicably stalled. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1) (2000).
70. 10 C.F.R. § 51.109(a)(1) (2005).
71. Id. § 51.109(a)(2).
72. See e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (involving one agency's
Biological Opinion and another agency's Biological Assessment); Strahan v. Linnon,
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the context of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 73 if an agency
determines in its Biological Assessment (BA) that its action has
the potential to affect listed species, that agency (the action
agency) must consult with the Fish & Wildlife Service (the Service), which must provide a Biological Opinion (BiOp) explaining
74
how the proposed action will affect the species or its habitat. If
the Service concludes that the action will result in adverse habitat
modification, the BiOp must outline "reasonable and prudent alternatives" that the Service believes will avoid that consequence. 7 5 After the Service issues the BiOp, the action agency
must decide whether to revisit its BA and adopt the reasonable
and prudent alternatives; however, the action agency is not legally
76
obligated to do so.
In Bennett v. Spear, the Supreme Court held that the Service's BiOp constituted a final agency action because it altered the
legal regime to which the action agency was subject and thus effectively authorized it to take action if it complied with the prescribed conditions-even though the action agency was free to
ignore the Service's conclusion. 7 7 Similarly, DOE's application
does not obligate the NRC to make a particular decision on the
license application, but it does alter the legal regime to which the
NRC is subject, because the license application launches the NRC
administrative process. Like the BiOp in the ESA context, DOE's
license application is no less final just because the NRC may or
may not require changes to the application prior to making its decision. Instead, the DOE application and FEIS constitute DOE's
final decision (like the BiOp), while the NRC's licensing decision
967 F. Supp. 581, 595 (D. Mass. 1997) (same); Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Glickman, 932 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D. Ariz. 1996) (same); see also Sierra Club
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 295 F.3d 1209, 1219 (11th Cir. 2002) (considering
the overlap between a Biological Assessment produced pursuant to the Endangered
Species Act and an EIS prepared under NEPA).
73.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).

74. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
75. Id.
76. Although no court has explicitly addressed whether a BA constitutes a "final
agency action," several courts have implicitly assumed that BAs were final agency
actions. See, e.g., Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 595 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding
that the Coast Guard's Biological Assessment was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," the standard of review for final
agency actions); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Glickman, 932 F. Supp. 1189, 1194
(D. Ariz. 1996). Further, a BA may often constitute a final agency action, although it
will not be ripe for review until there is a legal consequence. See infra Part III.C.2.c.
77. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
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will represent its final decision (like the BA). Though related, the
two decisions are separate and distinct final agency actions.
In addition, the license application and FEIS submission constitute a final agency action because once the site designation
takes effect, section 114 of the NWPA requires DOE to submit an
application for a construction authorization. 78 Thus, the application is nondiscretionary and fulfills DOE's statutory responsibility.7 9 More importantly, section 114 lacks language designating
the filing of the application as a "preliminary activity," language
which would render the recommendation of candidate sites and
the site characterization non-final for APA judicial review purposes.8 0 Accordingly, by negative implication, Congress did not
preclude judicial review of the Secretary of Energy's submission as
a non-final action.
In conclusion, there would be no point in submitting the license application if DOE had not determined that, in its view, the
Yucca Mountain site and certain facility attributes in the application would meet the project goals. Thus, the Secretary of Energy's
decision to submit a discrete set of documents to the NRC (i.e., the
license application and supporting FEIS) constitutes a final
agency action because it signals the conclusion of DOE efforts to
craft an application that satisfies NRC and EPA regulatory standards as well as DOE's determination that the FEIS encompasses
the impacts projected by the application.
b.

No Adequate Remedy in Court

In addition to the requirement that an agency action be final,
the APA requires that there be no other available remedy to review a final agency action. 8 ' It could be argued that DOE's application-the license application, including the SAR and general
information-would not be immediately reviewable under the
APA, because the NRC's administrative process provides an adequate alternative to judicial review. Certainly, judicial review of
the NRC's decision on radiological and safety issues or adoption
78. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(b) (2000).
79. It is now undisputed that an agency's failure to perform a statutorily required
duty constitutes a final agency action under the APA. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 599 (1988). Thus, it is nearly axiomatic that an action that completes a
substantive (as opposed to procedural) statutory duty is itself a "final agency action."
80. See Nevada v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Congress, in defining certain activities as "preliminary," precluded judicial review); see
also 42 U.S.C. §§ 10132(d), 10133(d) (2000).
81. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss2/6

16

2006]

ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS FOR YUCCA MTN.

481

would be appropriate after the NRC makes a final licensing decision. However, the administrative process does not afford potential parties with an adequate alternative remedy on the adequacy
of the "base" FEIS because, to the extent the NRC adopts the
FEIS, the NRC decision "shall be deemed to also satisfy the responsibilities of the Commission under [NEPA]."82 Further, NRC
regulations specifically limit the circumstances in which the NRC
would refuse to adopt the FEIS. 83 Because those regulations do
not provide for substantive challenges to the adequacy of the FEIS
(i.e., they only allow challenges to NRC's adoption determination),
and because the NRC's reasonable interpretation of its own adoption regulations is entitled to substantial deference upon judicial
review, 84 Nevada and other parties would have no avenue for
meaningful judicial review of the overall adequacy of the "base"
FEIS.
Additionally, any administrative review would necessarily be
limited because the Commission has directed that the presiding
officer review adoption contentions under the "motion to reopen"
standard, a standard that requires a showing that a cure of a purported inadequacy would lead to a materially different result
before administrative review is granted. 85 This standard, which
looks to the substantive decision, is more difficult to satisfy than
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard in the APA, which allows
review of mere procedural defects.
The view that the NRC's administrative process fails to lead
to an adequate remedy in a reviewing court is buttressed by the
few cases discussing what constitutes an "adequate remedy in
court" under the APA. In Bowen v. Massachusetts, the Supreme
Court described section 704 of the APA as a codification of the exhaustion requirement for the purpose of avoiding duplication of
existing procedures for review of agency action. 86 However, the
Court made clear that the APA's "'generous review provisions'
must be given 'hospitable' interpretation."' 8 7 Indeed, many courts
recognize an exception to the exhaustion requirement under the
82. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(f)(4).
83. 10 C.F.R. § 51.109 (2005).
84. See generally Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
85. 10 C.F.R. § 2.326 (2005); see also NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,864, 27,865 (July 3, 1989) (adopting
the Commission positions, in substantial part, at 53 Fed. Reg. 16,131, 16,142 (May 5,
1988)).
86. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988).
87. Id. at 904 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967)).
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APA when an agency lacks the power to grant effective relief,
making exhaustion a futile endeavor.88 This exception applies to
the NRC's review of DOE's license application because the NRC
licensing board does not have the equitable powers to require
DOE to revise or update its FEIS because the NRC, not DOE, is
the action agency in the administrative proceeding. Of course, the
licensing board could order the NRC to supplement or modify the
FEIS for purposes of making the NRC decision, but the board does
not have the equitable powers to order DOE to remedy any perceived inadequacies in DOE's FEIS (i.e., the DOE decision).
Another exception to the exhaustion requirement exists when
the agency has otherwise predetermined the issue before it.89
This exception also applies because, here, the NRC regulations are
premised on the adequacy of the "base" FEIS (or that such adequacy will be determined outside the NRC administrative process), and thus application of NRC regulations may not remedy
substantive inadequacies in the FEIS. For these reasons, there is
no adequate remedy beyond judicial review of the FEIS.
c.

Ripeness

In light of DOE's past legal position with regard to judicial
review of activities related to Yucca Mountain, it is probable that
DOE will argue that a challenge to the FEIS at the time the license application is submitted is not yet ripe. 90 However, under
the three factors relevant under the doctrine of ripeness-"(1)
whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2)
whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere
with further administrative action; and (3) whether the courts
would benefit from further factual development of the issues
presented," 9 1-the adequacy of the "base" FEIS would be ripe at
the time the license application is submitted by DOE to the NRC.
88. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147 (1992) (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 148.
90. In its brief to the D.C. Circuit arguing that Nevada's challenge to the FEIS
was not yet ripe, DOE noted that "review of the FEIS would be only an academic
exercise" until DOE used "the FEIS to support a proposed action related to Yucca
Mountain." Brief for Respondents at 42, Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F. 3d
1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 01-156, 02-1036, 02-1077, 02-1179, 02-1196), availableat
http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/legaln1030224cons.pdf. However, it is not clear
whether DOE intentionally left open the possibility for the interpretation advanced
by this note.
91. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998).
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First, delaying review will cause significant hardship because
the docketed license application creates legal consequences for the
NRC, DOE, and other parties in the administrative process. More
importantly, withholding consideration will cause hardship because it will effectively preclude judicial review of the adequacy of
the FEIS because the NRC administrative proceedings focus only
on adoption, do not provide for review of the adequacy of the FEIS,
satisfy the agency's NEPA obligations, and lead to substantial deference upon judicial review. 9 2 Next, the early resolution of issues
related to the FEIS will not inappropriately interfere with further
administrative action; instead, it will foster effective NRC administration by reducing the scope of issues to be considered administratively, resolving environmental issues outside of NRC
proceedings (consistent with congressional intent for the NWPA),
93
and leading to early resolution of certain environmental issues.
This view is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's conclusion in Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. that "the effect of the FEIS will not be
felt... until it is used to support some other final decision of DOE
94
or NRC."

92. See id.; see also supra Part III.C.2.b. Although the D.C. Circuit concluded, in
dicta, that substantive challenges to the adequacy of the FEIS would raise "new considerations" with regard to any decision to adopt DOE's FEIS, see Nuclear Energy
Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the court did not have the
benefit of briefing on the issue, which would have clearly demonstrated the NRC's
(and DOE's) consistent position that substantive challenges to DOE's FEIS have no
place in NRC administrative proceedings. The court simply reached an incorrect conclusion. Nevertheless, the legal position advanced herein would give meaning to the
purpose underlying the court's conclusion-that Nevada (and others) have an opportunity to challenge the substantive adequacy of DOE's FEIS at some point.
93. Early resolution is likely, given that a court starting review at the time the
license application is tendered should reach a decision sooner than a court starting
review several months to several years later, after the Commission makes a decision
subject to review in federal court. See also supra notes 37, 46-47 and accompanying
text (judicial review of the adoption decision need not await a final licensing decision).
Moreover, reversing the Commission decision could lead to additional delay by reopening NRC administrative proceedings, which could then lead to a second federal
court petition for review. Hence, judicial resolution of the adequacy of the FEIS
outside of NRC proceedings could lead to significant acceleration of a conclusive licensing decision. In the event that a court delayed judicial review of the FEIS until
the NRC made a licensing decision (see discussion supra Part I), there would be no
additional delay since judicial review of the FEIS would then take place at the same
time as review of the Commission decision. However, the other advantages (i.e., limited scope of administrative proceedings, conservation of staff resources, etc.) would
still accrue.
94. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc., 373 F.3d at 1313.
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Lastly, the issue to be reviewed-whether DOE's FEIS satisfies the requirements of NEPA-is purely legal. 95 A reviewing
court can assess whether the FEIS is adequate to support the
DOE action described in the license application. Thus, judicial review of the legal sufficiency of the FEIS would not benefit from
additional factual development, and therefore, review of the adequacy of the FEIS would be ripe at the time of DOE's submission
of the license application.
In contrast, however, review of the substantive proposal in
the license application is not ripe because there would be no hardship to the parties (i.e., they can participate in the administrative
process), and a court will benefit from further administrative proceedings and factual development. Thus, review of the adequacy
of the FEIS is ripe while a challenge to DOE's design is not. This
conclusion is buttressed by the Supreme Court's discussion of the
ripeness of NEPA claims in the case of Ohio Forestry.96 There, the
Court noted that a "person with standing who is injured by a failure to comply with the NEPA procedure may complain of that failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can never be
97
riper."
A series of cases on programmatic FEISs also lends support to
the view that DOE's FEIS is ripe. DOE's FEIS can be seen as a
programmatic document, because it will be used to support a host
of DOE activities related to the geologic repository operation area
that are not yet defined. According to DOE, the FEIS conservatively presents the reasonable foreseeable impacts and uses
bounding assumptions to address incomplete or unavailable information or uncertainties for several different activities, including
the site recommendation, the selection of the transportation alternative, the license application, and, to the extent it is adopted, the
NRC licensing decision. 98 Thus, in the sense that the FEIS is
designed to encompass a range of activities related to recommending, constructing, operating, and sending waste to a geologic
repository operations area, the FEIS can be seen as a programmatic document.
In Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, the court
determined that a challenge to a Forest Service programmatic
95. See City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 1986).
96. Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. at 737-39.
97. Id. at 737 (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., DOE FEIS, supra note 3, at S-36, CR8-1 (site recommendation and
transportation).
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FEIS proposing a plan for a herbicides application program was
reviewable before any specific applications of herbicides had been
authorized. 9 9 The court held that "plaintiffs need not wait to challenge a specific project when their grievance is with an overall
plan." 10 0 Because the FEIS set guidelines that determined future
herbicide applications, the court concluded that the Forest Service's failure to comply with NEPA represented a concrete injury,
and the plaintiffs' challenge was ripe for review. 01 ' Similarly, Nevada or others may take issue with the overall adequacy of the
FEIS rather than the way the FEIS is used to support a specific
action. Likewise, since the DOE proposal shapes the issues considered in the NRC administrative proceedings (i.e., the NRC will
assess the DOE proposal's compliance with regulatory requirements rather than propose its own repository) and other site-specific proposals such as the rail corridor, DOE's alleged failure to
comply with NEPA's requirements would be ripe for immediate
judicial review.
The court in Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma reasoned
that "if the agency action only could be challenged at the site-specific development stage, the underlying programmatic authorization would forever escape review." 10 2 Similarly, if DOE's FEIS
can only be challenged in a piecemeal fashion as it is used to support individual, specific decisions (e.g., license application or
transportation selection), the overall FEIS will escape comprehensive judicial review because, absent substantial and significant
new information, the decisions tiered off of the FEIS will not revisit impacts and alternatives already considered (i.e., the repository FEIS bounds impacts in the application and the
transportation selection).' 0 3 Thus, viewing the DOE FEIS as a
programmatic document leads to the same conclusion as the Ohio
Forestry analysis-that the FEIS would be ripe for review once it
is used to support DOE's application. 10 4

99. Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1994).
100. Id. at 1355; see also Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508,
1516 (9th Cir. 1992).
101. Salmon River Concerned Citizens, 32 F.3d at 1355.
102. Idaho ConservationLeague, 956 F.2d at 1516.
103. See Laub v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2003).
104. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n, 523 U.S. 726.
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d. Exhaustion
The DOE could try to direct a challenge to the FEIS into NRC
proceedings by asserting that Nevada and other intervenors failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing a civil action in federal court. This effort would likely fail, because the
availability of exhaustion is based on congressional intent, and
thus statutory language can repeal or amend the judicially created doctrine of exhaustion. 10 5 Since statutes providing for judicial review in courts of appeals, like the NWPA, "are jurisdictional
in nature and must be construed with strict fidelity to their
terms," exhaustion is not likely to be an issue because judicial review would not be based on any NRC action. 10 6 Instead, judicial
review would be based on the DOE action, which has no administrative options to exhaust. 10 7 Moreover, even if a reviewing court
were to read an exhaustion requirement into section 119 of the
NWPA, the exceptions discussed in section III.C.2(b) may apply.
Thus, administrative exhaustion is not likely to apply to the DOE
action.
3.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Courts of
Appeals

Having determined that there is a final agency action, any
challenge to the FEIS used to support DOE's license application
must be brought in the courts of appeals. Section 119(a)(1)(D) of
the NWPA grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the courts
of appeals over any civil action "for review of any environmental
impact statement prepared ... with respect to any action under
this subtitle."0 8 The NWPA further requires that such a civil action be brought within 180 days after the date of the decision or
action or failure to act. 0 9 Because DOE's submission of a license
application for construction authorization is required by section
114(b) of the NWPA (i.e., it is an action under the NWPA), the
accompanying FEIS must be challenged within 180 days of
tendering the application." 0 Indeed, the Commission has previ105. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144-45 (1992).
106. Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995).
107. Id.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(D) (2000) (emphasis added).
109. Id. § 10139(c).
110. It is important to remember that the challenge to the FEIS in federal court is
based on DOE's agency action (license application submission and FEIS), while NRC
administrative proceedings revolve around the NRC action (adoption). Moreover, the
Commission's decision on adoption could be a separate action from issuance of the
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ously noted that the "NWPA authorizes a civil action to review
any EIS prepared with respect to 'any action' under the applicable
subpart and, given our perspective on the intended allocation of
functions between DOE and NRC, 'any action' could include the
Secretary of Energy's submission of an application to the Commission."1 1 ' While it is doubtful that the NWPA actually creates a
cause of action as the Commission asserted, its view that tendering the license application is an action under the NWPA remains
valid. Further, this position is not inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit opinion in Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. In holding that Nevada's challenge to the FEIS was not ripe for review, the court
reasoned that Nevada's substantive claims against the FEIS
would not be fit for review until the FEIS was used to support a
concrete and final decision, because the effect of the FEIS would
not be felt until it was used to support some other final decision of
DOE or NRC. 112 Although the court appears to be primarily concerned with the use of the FEIS to support DOE selection of a
transportation alternative or an NRC decision on construction authorization, it nevertheless recognizes that "DOE is expected to
use the FEIS to support one or more future decisions related to
Yucca Mountain .... ,,13 As discussed previously, the license application and FEIS are concrete and final decisions. The remainder of the court's discourse on review of substantive claims against
the FEIS in administrative hearings is dicta. Thus, requiring judicial review, as opposed to administrative review, of the FEIS
used to support DOE's license application is consistent with the
construction authorization. As such, if the presiding officer in the NRC's licensing
proceeding were to issue an initial decision on the practicability of adoption, that action would dispose of a major segment of the proceeding and would therefore be appealable to the Commission. See In re Boston Edison Co., 13 N.R.C. 91, 93 n.2 (1981)
(holding that a partial initial decision in an operating license proceeding that resolves
a number of safety issues, but does not authorize issuance of an operating license, is
nevertheless appealable, because it disposes of a major segment of the case). A final
Commission decision on appeal would trigger a separate opportunity for federal court
review of the adoption determination under the APA and section 119(a). Alternatively, if the Commission did not issue a separate decision on adoption apart from its
final licensing determination, the courts of appeals would have jurisdiction to review
that licensing decision and adoption determination. 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(D).
111. The Commission also takes the position that, consistent with the clear policy
of the NWPA requiring prompt adjudication of the issues raised by the FEIS, failure
to challenge DOE's FEIS promptly in the courts bars subsequent challenges to the
FEIS in NRC proceedings. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for
High-Level Waste, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,864, 27,866 (July 3, 1989).
112. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1312-13 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
113. Id. at 1312.
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NWPA and the Commission's views and is not inconsistent with
the court's holding.
4.

Practical Implications

Requiring immediate judicial review of the FEIS has several
implications for the NRC adoption process and the scope of review
in NRC administrative proceedings. First, instead of relying
heavily on the congressional resolution selecting Yucca Mountain
and NRC review of the Draft EIS, the basis for the Commission
presumption of FEIS adequacy would expand to include judicial
review. 1 14 Before making a final decision on adoption (at the end
of the administrative hearing process), the Commission could
have the benefit of judicial review of the FEIS where any inadequacies would be treated as "new considerations" subject to admission for adjudication under the NRC late-filed contentions
standard. 1" 5 In that case, the Commission could ensure satisfaction of a "basic premise of § 51.109 . . . that it is practicable to
adopt the [FIEIS prepared by DOE if [it] is adequate to meet the
l 6
requirements of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA." "
Furthermore, there are substantial practical benefits to requiring parallel, but not overlapping, reviews of the FEIS. First,
because the NRC's primary expertise is radiological health and
safety, NRC administrative resources would be focused on those
areas rather than diluted through a broad inquiry into environmental impacts. The NRC would therefore be able to save the resources necessary to determine and adjudicate the adequacy of the
FEIS. Second, reducing the scope of the NRC administrative responsibilities would help the agency meet its statutory goal for
making a licensing decision.
Additionally, requiring DOE to defend its FEIS in federal
court would eliminate the awkwardness of having the NRC defend
DOE's FEIS in NRC proceedings (and perhaps ultimately in the
court of appeals) when the NRC played no role in crafting the balance of impacts in the FEIS and, in fact, may not even agree with
DOE's conclusions. 1 7 Instead, the NRC staffs role would be lim114. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 54
Fed. Reg. at 27,865-66 (July 3, 1989); NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste 53 Fed. Reg. 16,131, 16,143 (May 5, 1988).
115. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309 (2005).
116. NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 53
Fed. Reg. at 16,142.
117. Simply because the staff provided comments to DOE on the Draft EIS does
not mean that DOE adopted the position advanced in those comments, nor does it
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ited to assessing the impacts associated with new and significant
information or impacts associated with the NRC action (if different from the DOE action) as required by the NRC's adoption regulations. In making the adoption determination, the NRC, as
opposed to DOE, would craft the balance between competing interests, and its position would not necessarily be aligned with
DOE. 118 In addition, there would be little to no information on the
administrative record to support a staff position on the adequacy
of the FEIS, because the staff did not make the initial conclusion
in the FEIS. This would also clarify the scope of the staffs review
of the FEIS prior to its initial recommendation on the practicability of adoption. For instance, the resources necessary to independently review the entire FEIS for adequacy are greater than those
required to determine whether there is new and significant information. This view would also ensure fairness by granting interested parties an opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the
FEIS in some forum-either federal court or NRC administrative
proceedings.
Lastly, parallel reviews of the FEIS would reduce the risk
that NRC's regulations for adoption might be found inadequate as
applied or that the NRC final position on the adequacy of the
FEIS was incorrect upon judicial review of the NRC's final licensing decision. In either instance, having a court initiate review of
the FEIS contemporaneously with the license application would
accelerate the timing of a final decision on the adequacy of the
FEIS.

mean that the NRC would have independently arrived at the same conclusion regarding the proper balancing of the environmental costs and benefits of the proposed action. For example, DOE might decide that certain radiological releases to the
environment are of small significance, while the NRC staff, on the same set of facts,
might conclude that the impacts are moderate. However, that difference would not
prevent the NRC from adopting the FEIS unless there was significant or substantial
new information. If, however, substantive challenges to the FEIS were admitted in
the licensing proceeding, NRC staff could find itself defending DOE's conclusion that
the significance was small. On the other hand, if judicial review of the FEIS was
available, DOE would have to defend its own conclusion in federal court.
118. As one solution to this odd posture, the NRC staff might elect to not participate with regard to substantive environmental contentions. While the regulations
governing proceedings for licensing of geologic repositories, or Subpart J proceedings,
do not explicitly allow the NRC staff to elect not to participate, see 10 C.F.R. ch.1, pt.
2, subpt. J (2005), as is allowed in Subpart L proceedings (informal hearings and NRC
adjudications), see 10 C.F.R. § 2.1202(b), the staff could decline to take a position on a
specific contention challenging the adequacy of the FEIS.
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lV. CONCLUSION
The NWPA changes the generally applicable requirements of
NEPA in two significant ways for both the NRC and DOE. First,
the NWPA severely limits the range of alternatives to be considered as part of an environmental impact statement associated
with a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain to the no-action alternative. Second, the NWPA alters the NRC's role in performing
environmental reviews and also seeks to avoid any duplication of
those reviews. Any party seeking to challenge the substantive adequacy of DOE's FEIS should be able to raise those concerns by
challenging DOE (not the NRC) in federal court once DOE submits its license application. The NRC's administrative process is
not the appropriate venue for such challenges because Congress
has made clear that environmental issues are to be resolved by
DOE via federal courts while the NRC and its administrative proceedings should focus on issues of radiological health and safety.
Any administrative hearing on Yucca Mountain is likely to be a
long and protracted affair given the tenacity of the repository's opponents. Judicial review of the adequacy of the FEIS in federal
court would make this process more efficient by giving DOE a definitive decision on the FEIS and allowing NRC to make a faster
decision on the license application.
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